On the natural selection of market choice

Aviv Bergman, Moshe Tennenholtz

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

An evolutionary approach to the problem of economic mechanism choice is presented. It demonstrates the power that a single participant has on the choice of a preferred market mechanism. A population of sellers, each with one of two possible economic mechanisms, facing potential buyers, is presented as a test model. It is shown that if two auctions, such as first- and second-price auctions, are to attract an identical number of buyers, although under the model assumptions their expected revenues are identical, sellers using a first-price auction mechanism will be selected for. However, if a second-price auction attracts one additional buyer, then it will be selected for by the evolutionary process. These results are extended to the choice between an arbitrary k- and l-price auctions.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)387-395
Number of pages9
JournalAutonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Volume5
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - 2002
Externally publishedYes

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Economics

Keywords

  • Evolutionary dynamics
  • Market choice

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Artificial Intelligence

Cite this

On the natural selection of market choice. / Bergman, Aviv; Tennenholtz, Moshe.

In: Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, Vol. 5, No. 4, 2002, p. 387-395.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Bergman, Aviv ; Tennenholtz, Moshe. / On the natural selection of market choice. In: Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems. 2002 ; Vol. 5, No. 4. pp. 387-395.
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