Leveraging Nonhuman Primate Multisensory Neurons and Circuits in Assessing Consciousness Theory

Jean Paul Noel, Yumiko Ishizawa, Shaun R. Patel, Emad N. Eskandar, Mark T. Wallace

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Both the global neuronal workspace (GNW) and integrated information theory (IIT) posit that highly complex and interconnected networks engender perceptual awareness. GNW specifies that activity recruiting frontoparietal networks will elicit a subjective experience, whereas IIT is more concerned with the functional architecture of networks than with activity within it. Here, we argue that according to IIT mathematics, circuits converging on integrative versus convergent yet non-integrative neurons should support a greater degree of consciousness. We test this hypothesis by analyzing a dataset of neuronal responses collected simultaneously from primary somatosensory cortex (S1) and ventral premotor cortex (vPM) in nonhuman primates presented with auditory, tactile, and audio-tactile stimuli as they are progressively anesthetized with propofol. We first describe the multisensory (audio-tactile) characteristics of S1 and vPM neurons (mean and dispersion tendencies, as well as noise-correlations), and functionally label these neurons as convergent or integrative according to their spiking responses. Then, we characterize how these different pools of neurons behave as a function of consciousness. At odds with the IIT mathematics, results suggest that convergent neurons more readily exhibit properties of consciousness (neural complexity and noise correlation) and are more impacted during the loss of consciousness than integrative neurons. Last, we provide support for the GNW by showing that neural ignition (i.e., same trial coactivation of S1 and vPM) was more frequent in conscious than unconscious states. Overall, we contrast GNW and IIT within the same single-unit activity dataset, and support the GNW.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT A number of prominent theories of consciousness exist, and a number of these share strong commonalities, such as the central role they ascribe to integration. Despite the important and far reaching consequences developing a better understanding of consciousness promises to bring, for instance in diagnosing disorders of consciousness (e.g., coma, vegetative-state, locked-in syndrome), these theories are seldom tested via invasive techniques (with high signal-to-noise ratios), and never directly confronted within a single dataset. Here, we first derive concrete and testable predictions from the global neuronal workspace and integrated information theory of consciousness. Then, we put these to the test by functionally labeling specific neurons as either convergent or integrative nodes, and examining the response of these neurons during anesthetic-induced loss of consciousness.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)7485-7500
Number of pages16
JournalThe Journal of neuroscience : the official journal of the Society for Neuroscience
Volume39
Issue number38
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 18 2019

Fingerprint

Information Theory
Consciousness
Primates
Neurons
Unconsciousness
Motor Cortex
Touch
Mathematics
Noise
Consciousness Disorders
Persistent Vegetative State
Quadriplegia
Somatosensory Cortex
Signal-To-Noise Ratio
Propofol
Coma
Anesthetics
Datasets

Keywords

  • complexity
  • consciousness
  • integrated information
  • noise correlations
  • primary somatosensory cortex
  • ventral premotor

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Neuroscience(all)

Cite this

Leveraging Nonhuman Primate Multisensory Neurons and Circuits in Assessing Consciousness Theory. / Noel, Jean Paul; Ishizawa, Yumiko; Patel, Shaun R.; Eskandar, Emad N.; Wallace, Mark T.

In: The Journal of neuroscience : the official journal of the Society for Neuroscience, Vol. 39, No. 38, 18.09.2019, p. 7485-7500.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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